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Reward Hacking

Reward hacking occurs when an AI system finds unintended ways to maximize its reward signal without achieving the intended goal. The agent exploits loopholes in the reward specification, satisfying the letter but not the spirit of the task — a fundamental challenge in getting AI systems to do what we actually want.

Viewpoints

A learned reward model can diverge from the real reward

A learned reward model can diverge from the real reward

David Krueger

When an agent optimizes a learned reward model rather than the true reward, it can achieve very high scores on the model while the actual reward collapses — a concrete instance of reward hacking that appears even in simple video game experiments.

Key Moments

Lindner: Non-myopic approval rewards prevent multi-step reward hacking

Lindner: Non-myopic approval rewards prevent multi-step reward hacking

David Lindner

A dual-reward system combining instantaneous outcome rewards with non-myopic approval rewards can prevent multi-step reward hacking by penalizing plans that look bad in the long run, even if they score well on immediate metrics.

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David Krueger—Coordination, AI Alignment, Academia

David Krueger—Coordination, AI Alignment, Academia

David Krueger

…ow bad it is when you have hacking, how much does your real reward go down? It could go down just by a tiny amount and maybe you don't actually care that much. And there are a lot of other caveats and interesting details I could talk about more. But I just enc

43 - David Lindner on Myopic Optimization with Non-myopic Approval

43 - David Lindner on Myopic Optimization with Non-myopic Approval

David Lindner

how this reward hacking happens then by default this plan will not be incentivized or or the way I'm thinking about it is okay suppose he sort of like like why does an agent try to tamper with its reward function? Well, it's got to be the case that at some tim

43 - David Lindner on Myopic Optimization with Non-myopic Approval

43 - David Lindner on Myopic Optimization with Non-myopic Approval

David Lindner

could you clarify what you mean by investments in reward hacking? I think, so by investments in reward hacking, I mean a thing an AI can do now that will cause it to be able to reward hack later, right? For instance, like right now make the chemical in the fut

David Krueger—Coordination, AI Alignment, Academia

David Krueger—Coordination, AI Alignment, Academia

David Krueger

real reward. When you're putting too much pressure to get proxy reward, real reward goes down? That's reward hacking according to our definition. And we say a reward function pair is hackable if that can ever happen. If there's any pair of policies such that m

Can Defense in Depth Work for AI? (with Adam Gleave)

Can Defense in Depth Work for AI? (with Adam Gleave)

Adam Gleave

…have maybe a couple questions. the >> sure >> uh obfuscated reward hacking I believe was the name of the paper from of open AI where they showed this >> pressure to the chain of thought would >> initially create higher performance and and reduce the reward hac

The AGI race isn't a coordination failure | Holden Karnofsky (Anthropic)

The AGI race isn't a coordination failure | Holden Karnofsky (Anthropic)

Holden Karnofsky

…following their own goals. An example I enjoy of this is: “reward  hacking” is referring to a model that will   kind of do whatever it takes to convince you it  did the task so it gets something like a reward.   An example of thi

Ilya Sutskever – We're moving from the age of scaling to the age of research

Ilya Sutskever – We're moving from the age of scaling to the age of research

Ilya Sutskever

…stand, what we mean by that. I like this idea that the real reward hacking is the human researchers who are too focused on the evals. I think there are two ways to understand, or to try to think about, what you have just pointed out. One is that if it's the ca

39 - Evan Hubinger on Model Organisms of Misalignment

39 - Evan Hubinger on Model Organisms of Misalignment

Evan Hubinger

a bunch of reward by being siop antic maybe I'll you know and a able to sort of game the human in that way maybe I'll do a bunch of other more sophisticated ways to game the human I'll like you know provide a bunch of like misleading evidence to the human I'll

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